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ABSTRACT 
One of the most remarkable features of globalization is the boost 
undergone by international trade triggered off by advances in technology that 
have contributed to reduce the cost of trade (e.g., transportation and 
communication costs). Under these circumstances, the importance of distance 
should have diminished over time, which would constitute a boon for countries 
located far from the main centers of economic activity. However, one of the best-
established empirical results in international economics is that bilateral trade 
decreases with distance. This apparent contradiction has been labeled as the 
“missing globalization puzzle”. We propose yet another explanation to this 
apparent contradiction based on the concept of geographic neutrality, which we 
use to construct international trade integration indicators for two different 
scenarios, namely, when distance matters and when it does not. Our results 
indicate that the importance of distance varies greatly across countries, as revealed 
by disparate gaps between distance-corrected and distance-uncorrected trade 
integration indicators for different countries. Some factors rooted in the literature 
explain away the discrepancies, but their importance varies according to the trade 
integration indicator considered —trade openness or trade connection. 
Keywords: Geographic Neutrality, Globalization, Gravity Models, 
Network Analysis, Remoteness  
RESUMEN 
Uno de los rasgos más relevantes de la globalización es el incremento 
experimentado por el comercio internacional, desencadenado en parte por los 
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avances tecnológicos,  que han contribuido a reducir los costes del comercio (por 
ejemplo, costes de transporte y comunicaciones). Bajo estas circunstancias, la 
importancia de la distancia debería haber disminuido con el tiempo, lo que 
constituiría una gran ayuda para aquellos países localizados más remotamente de 
los mayores centros de actividad económica. Sin embargo, uno de los resultados 
más sólidamente establecidos en economía internacional es que el comercio 
bilateral disminuye con la distancia. A esta aparente contradicción se la conoce 
como “the missing globalization puzzle”. En este trabajo se propone una 
explicación alternativa a esta aparente contradicción basada en el concepto de 
neutralidad geográfica, que utilizamos para construir indicadores de integración 
económica internacional para dos escenarios diferentes dependiendo del papel 
otorgado a la distancia. Algunos factores arraigados en la literatura explican en 
parte estas discrepancias, pero su importancia varía dependiendo del indicador de 
integración considerado (apertura o conexión). 
Palabras clave: neutralidad geográfica, globalización, modelos de 
gravedad, análisis de redes 
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1. Introduction 
The gravity model of bilateral trade is of primary importance in empirical 
analyses of trade patterns. Its simplest version states that trade interactions 
between two geographically defined economic entities (either countries or 
regions) are proportional to the size of these entities and inversely related to the 
distance between them (Combes 2008). Not only has the model been utilized to 
further understand the underpinnings of trade flows in general but also to assess 
the role of their particular determinants such as distance, borders, currency unions, 
WTO membership, insecurity, institutions, etc. (Henderson and Millimet 2008). 
According to these models, proximity is the main engine of trade between 
spatially distinct economic entities and, although this could a priori appear as an 
obsolete view of the world if one believes in the “death of distance” or the 
emergence of the “global village” (Mcluhan and Fiore 1968), there is a 
widespread reliance on the gravity model based both on its solid theoretical 
foundation, derived from several underlying theories (see, for instance, Anderson 
1979¸ Deardorff 1998; Evenett and Keller 2002) and the fact that it has proven 
empirically successful —explaining much of the variation in trade volume over 
time and space. In their meta-analysis study, Disdier and Head (2008) found that 
halving distance increased trade by 45%, and more recent analyses by these 
authors suggest that the distance effect has actually increased in recent years. 
Based on these ideas, some authors such as Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) 
state that the gravity model provides “some of the clearest and most robust 
empirical findings in economics” (Leamer and Levinsohn 1995, p. 1384), whereas 
others such as (Rose 2000) note that the gravity model provides a “framework 
with a long track record of success” (Rose 2000, p.11). Anderson and Van 
Wincoop (2003) concur: “The gravity equation is one of the most empirically 
successful in economics'” (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2003, p.170). This 
successful performance of the gravity model for explaining bilateral flows has 
been recently boosted by the availability of a growing number of “natural 
experiments” in the form of regional trade agreements (Greenaway and Milner 
2002). 
As recognized by the literature on international trade, the standard gravity 
models that are usually estimated in the log-linear form are unable to capture the 
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significant decline in trade costs brought by globalization of the world economy. 
These ideas were initially noted by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), who stated that 
“the effect of distance on trade patterns is not diminishing over time. Contrary to 
popular impression, the world is not getting dramatically smaller”. Some authors 
refer to this as the “missing globalization puzzle” (Coe et al. 2002, 2007). Other 
recent proposals refer to it as “the conservation of distance in international trade” 
(Berthelon and Freund 2008), “the puzzling persistence of the distance effect on 
bilateral trade” (Disdier and Head 2008), or the question is even more strongly 
posed when asking whether “has distance died?” (Brun et al., 2005), or when 
stating that “it is alive and well” (Carrere and Schiff 2005). The number of studies 
on the issue is substantial, and the meta-analysis by Disdier and Head (2008) 
provides a useful summary, concluding that the estimated negative impact of 
distance on trade rose around the middle of the twentieth century, has remained 
persistently high since then, and such a result holds even after controlling for the 
heterogeneity in samples and methods across studies. 
In this paper we suggest yet another solution to the “missing globalization 
puzzle” in the gravity equation. We build on Arribas et al. (2000), who construct 
indices of international trade integration taking into account some relevant yet 
somehow “forgotten” ideas by the international economics literature, namely, the 
Standard of Perfect International Integration devised by Frankel (2000), and the 
concept of geographic neutrality (Kunimoto 1977; Krugman 1996). Considering 
also some ideas derived from network analysis theory, whose importance for trade 
has been recently revealed by Kali and Reyes (2007), Arribas et al. (2009) 
construct an indicator of international trade integration decomposable into two 
components aimed at measuring both how trade open and how connected 
economies are. 
Our solution to the missing globalization puzzle is based on a modified 
version of Arribas et al.’s (2009) indicators of integration. Motivated by the robust 
empirical regularity that bilateral trade flows between pairs of countries are 
explained well by the product of their gross domestic products (GDPs) and, very 
importantly, their bilateral distance, we include the latter when building our 
measures of trade integration. Specifically, we construct indicators for which both 
inter-country and intra-country distances are taken into account, since both are 
relevant for countries' imports and exports as documented not only by the 
literature on gravity equations (in the case of inter-country distances) but also by 
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Alesina and Spolaore (1997) (in the case of intra-country distances) and, in 
general, the literature on the home market effect hypothesis (big countries produce 
more of goods with scale economies). The comparison of both sets of indices 
(distance-corrected and distance-uncorrected) enables carrying out a new 
assessment of the role of distance for determining international trade flows. 
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the 
methodological contents of our approach to measure international trade 
integration. Sections 3 and 4 present the data set and empirical application, 
respectively, by considering data on exports of goods for a wide set of countries 
that account for most of world output and trade, and for a relatively long sample 
period (1967-2005). Section 5 explores the determinants of the discrepancies 
between the original and distance-corrected trade integration indicators. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
2. Defining distance-corrected integration indicators 
The first component of international trade integration we consider is a 
modified version of the standard trade openness indicator ( GDPMX )/( + ). The 
second component is derived from the inclusion of the structure of the current 
trade relations between countries —what some authors have labeled the 
“architecture” of trade flows (Kali and Reyes 2007). Relevant aspects of this 
architecture include the number of trade partners, the proportionality of trade 
flows to the size of the partners,1 and the role of barriers —particularly distance. 
In order to characterize a benchmark of trade integration, we define an 
extension of the concept of geographic neutrality (Kunimoto 1977, Krugman 
1996; Iapadre 2006) closely related to the Standard of Perfect International 
Integration (SPII) by Arribas et al. (2009):2 “geographically neutral” trade exists 
when country B 's share of A 's exports is equal to B 's share of gross world 
product outside A  (Krugman 1996, p. 64). Our notion of integration shares with 
                                                 
1 This approach has several links with the literature on social networks. See, for instance, Annen 
(2003), Hanneman and Riddle (2005), Karlin and Taylor (1975), Wasserman and Faust (1992), or 
Wellman and Berkovitz (1998). 
2 See originally Frankel (2000). 
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the SPII by Arribas et al. (2009) that it also verifies the properties of domestic 
neutrality, direct international neutrality and size, but differs in the consideration 
of the distance as a key factor. More precisely, our definition of SPII also 
integrates the Samuelson's (1954) standard iceberg assumptions, thus we consider 
that the flow between two economies not only is proportional to their relative 
sizes but also depends inversely on the distance between the economies. In short, 
under our neutrality assumption the following properties must be verified:3 
Domestic neutrality: An economy whose domestic demand is 
proportional to its share of the world economy will have a higher level of 
integration. 
Direct international neutrality: An economy that balances its direct 
relations with other individual economy, in proportion to their sizes and inversely 
to their distances will have a higher level of integration. 
In order to analyze the extent to which economies meet the two properties 
mentioned above, we must define an integration index, and measure the gap 
between the current level of integration and the SPII. We will proceed in three 
stages, each one defining different indicators. 
2.1. Notation 
Let N  be the set of economies and let i  and j  be typical members of this 
set. Even when the following definitions should be indexed by the year, to clarify 
notation that index will be dropped. Let iY  be the size of economy Ni∈ , for 
example it’s GDP , let ijd  be the geographic distance between the economies i  
and j , and let iid  be economy i 's internal distance. 
In order to compare economies that are not contiguous, we follow 
Samuelson's standard “iceberg” assumption considering that if a economy j  of 
size jY  gets as close to economy i  as possible, then its size will be reduced to 
θ
ijj dY /  (i.e., as stated by Samuelson (1954), “only a fraction of ice exported 
reaches its destination as unmelted ice”), where θ  is a non-negative parameter 
                                                 
3 See Arribas et al. (2009) for further details. 
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which measures the impact of distance (the farther away economies are, the 
greater the reduction, with an intensity that depends on the θ  parameter). In the 
extreme case in which 0=θ  the “iceberg” effect disappears. 
We define ir  as the economy i 's relative weight with respect to a world 
economy where the correction through distance has been performed (distance 
corrected world)  i.e., )/()//(=
θθ
ijjNjiiii
dYdYr ∑ ∈ . Notice that: (i) we also consider 
that there exists an iceberg effect on the home economy, (due to countries' 
differing geographic sizes) or, equivalently, that transportation cost exists both for 
inter- and intra-national trade; (ii) the above definition does not depend on the 
units of measurement for the distance between economies given that ir  can be 
written as ))//((/=
θ
iiijjNjii
ddYYr ∑ ∈ . This expression enables re-interpreting the 
effect of the geographic distance as the one given by a normalized distance matrix 
between economies where every internal distance of the economies is 1 and the 
distance from economy i  to economy j  is iiij dd / , the times the geographic 
distance between these economies is bigger than the economy i 's internal 
distance; and (iii) the impact of the distance depends on the θ  parameter. In a 
world where the distance is irrelevant, 0=θ  (geographic neutrality).4 
Given a measurable relationship between economies, we define the flow 
ijX  as the intensity of this relationship from economy i  to economy j . The flow 
between economies can be evaluated through either the imports or the exports of 
goods, capital, or any other flow measured in the same units as iY . Moreover, in 
general the flow will be asymmetric, so that ijX  will not necessarily be equal to 
jiX , for all Nji ∈, . We also assume that 0=iiX  for all economy Ni∈ .5 All 
definitions in the paper depend on the flow considered to measure the 
international integration. 
                                                 
4 As suggested by one referee, the iceberg type transport costs could be modeled differently, by 
using ji
d ,θτ  or θijd+1 . Although this alternative modeling could have some benefits, they are 
overshadowed by the costs of making a direct comparison with our proposal. 
5 Obviously, this is a remarkable assumption. However, we do not have this information for all 59 
countries and the 1967-2005 period. 
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2.2. Definitions 
The following definitions are based on those in Arribas et al. (2009) but 
adapting them so as to control for distance —both internal and between countries. 
In this section we present the mathematical definitions and we address the readers 
to the article by Arribas et al. (2009) for further details. 
 Degree of openness 
First we characterize the degree of openness assuming that output is not 
domestically-biased —i.e., it is not biased towards domestic demand. In order to 
remove the domestic (or home) bias we define íˆY  as the flow from economy i  to 
the world controlling for the weight in the distance-corrected world economy of 
the economy under analysis, namely, ˆ = −i i i iY Y rY . Then, we define the relative 
flow or degree of openness between economies i  and j  as ˆ= /ij ij iDO X Y . Given 
that 0=iiX , it follows that 0=iiDO  for all Ni∈ . 
Definition 1. Given an economy Ni∈ , we define its degree of openness, 
iDO , as  
 = = .ˆ
ijj N
i ij
j N i
X
DO DO
Y
∈
∈
∑∑      (1) 
We write DO  instead of iDO  when general statements on the degree of 
openness are being made, or references to the variable itself, which do not hang 
on any specific economy. The same rule will be applied to the other indicators. 
Degree of balanced connection 
In the second stage we analyze the “trade architecture” (Kali and Reyes 
2007), i.e., whether the connection of one economy with others is proportional to 
their sizes in terms of GDP ,6 or whether this connection does not show 
geographical neutrality. Thus, we define the degree of balanced connection to 
                                                 
6 The dependence of both the number and magnitude of exchanges on economy size is the focus of 
international trade analyses based on gravity models and widely used in the literature (Hummels 
and Levinsohn 1995; Feenstra et al. 1998, 2001; Rauch 1999). 
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measure the discrepancy between the trade volumes in the real world and those 
corresponding to the SPII. 
In the trade network, the relative flow from economy i  to economy j  in 
terms of the total flow of economy i , ijα , is given by  
 = ijij
ijj N
X
X
α
∈∑       (2) 
(recall that we are assuming 0=iiX ). Let )(= ijA α  be the square matrix of 
relative flows: the component ij  of matrix A  is ijα . 
We consider that the distance-corrected world economy is perfectly 
connected if the flow between two economies is proportional to their relative sizes 
(geographically neutral trade). Thus, if the world trade is neutral (which would be 
a “perfectly connected world economy”, following the SPII nomenclature), then 
the flow from economy i  to economy j  should be equal to ˆβij iY , where 
 
\
/
=
( / )
j ij
ij
k ikk N i
Y d
Y d
θ
θβ
∈∑       (3) 
is the relative weight of economy j  in a distance-corrected world where economy 
i  is not considered. 
Note that 1=\ ijiNj β∑ ∈  and that ijβ  is the degree of openness between 
economies i  and j  in the “perfectly connected world” (i.e., the world in which 
trade is geographically neutral), with 0=iiβ . Let )(= ijB β  be the square matrix 
of degrees of openness in the geographically neutral trade world (“perfectly 
connected world”). 
Definition 2. Given an economy Ni∈  we define the degree of balance 
connection of i , DBC i , as  
 ( ) ( )2 2= .
ij ijj N
i
ij ijj N j N
DBC
α β
α β
∈
∈ ∈
∑
∑ ∑    (4) 
 9
 Degree of integration 
We construct the degree of integration by combining the degree of 
openness and the degree of balanced connection defined above: 
Definition 3 Given an economy Ni∈  we define its degree of integration, 
DI i , as  
 iiii DBCDODODI },1/{min=     (5) 
Note that for both components of DI  we set limits to the integration level 
achieved. Therefore, our indicators consider the two main regressors included in 
any gravity equation, i.e., the size of the trading partners, and the distance 
between them. One of their advantages is that, instead of providing us with 
information as to whether these variables are important for trade flows, it will be 
possible to measure the gap from the scenario of complete trade integration in 
goods under different hypotheses on the impact of distance (on the “iceberg” 
effect).7 
3. Data presentation  
We consider the international economic integration indicators defined 
above to study the evolution of international trade. Some modifications on the 
indices would enable analyzing also other types of integration such as 
international financial integration. Our application is restricted to trade flows only, 
for which it is required information on the volume of activity (GDP) for each 
country together with their trade flows with the rest of the world. 
Data on bilateral trade flows come from the data set CHELEM.8 They 
correspond to 59 countries accounting for 96.7% of world output and 86.5% of 
                                                 
7 We admit the way to aggregate both partial indices ( DO  and DBC ) is somewhat ad hoc. 
However, our main point is that it is important for trade integration considering both effects, 
regardless of the way they are combined. 
8 Information on CHELEM (Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et l'Economie Mondiale, or 
Harmonised Accounts on Trade and The World Economy) database is available at URL 
http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/chelem.htm. Data compiled by CEPII, Paris. 
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international trade. The variable selected to measure the flows between countries 
is the volume of exports.9 
The available information covers a relatively long period of time, from 
1967 to 2005, covering entirely what some authors have labeled the second wave 
of globalization (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999, 2002; Maddison 2001). The 
data set also contained information for other countries, yet it was not available for 
all sample years, thus we finally decided not to include it. 
The same institution providing data on trade flows and GDP (CEPII, Paris) 
provides also other relevant pieces of required information such as distance. Two 
types of distances are considered. The distance from country i  to country j  
(external distance, ijd ) is measured by the distance between the main city of the 
country which, in most cases, is the capital of the country. The data set also 
provides data for internal distances ( iid ), as also required by our indices. See 
Head and Mayer (2002) for details.10 
Our analysis is restricted to trade in goods. Since specialization patterns 
vary across countries, there is a bias for our indices which will affect countries 
differently. However, extending the analysis to account for trade in services is not 
possible, since there is no services equivalent to the matrix of trade in goods 
between country pairs. 
4. Results  
4.1. Degree of openness, degree of balanced connection and degree of 
integration 
As indicated in Figure 1.a, on average, the degree of openness has more 
than doubled (for 0=θ ) and almost tripled (for 1=θ ) from 1967 to 2005. 
                                                 
9 The computations for indicators based on imports do not alter the general results, although they 
may differ for some specific countries. These results are not reported due to space limitations, but 
are available from the authors upon request. 
10 See also www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm. 
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Comparing 
0=θ
iDO  to 
1=θ
iDO , accounting for distance makes the degree of 
openness increase from 32.09% to 40.71% (year 2005). Figure 1.a shows the 
evolution of 0=θDO  and 1=θDO  summary statistics (mean, weighted mean, and 
median). In all cases there is a sharp increase, although the effect is dimmed for 
the larger countries (weighted mean), especially under geographic neutrality 
( 0=θ ). 
Results for the degree of global openness ( DGO ) correspond to the 
evolution of the weighted mean in both upper panels in Figure 1. They are also 
reported in Table 1. The values are reported explicitly given our specific interest 
in measuring trade integration. It would suggest how open the world economy is, 
and it is apparent that if we recognize that distance matters (including it explicitly 
to construct the indicators), the level of openness is higher. In both instances, 
however, the degree of openness advances at a similar pace: in the economy 
where distance is irrelevant ( 0=θ ), the increase is from 8.03% to 20.84%, and in 
case location mattered ( 1=θ ), the increase is higher (from 12.13% to 32.27%). 
However, the analysis by subperiods discloses additional results: under 0=θ , the 
highest increase took place after 1986, whereas for 1=θ  it occurred before. This 
finding may be explained by the role of countries such as Japan, which is big in 
GDP terms (therefore its behavior affects the evolution of DGO ), which is 
distant, and whose 
0=θ
iDO  increased sharply before 1986. 
Figure 1.b displays results for the degree of balanced connection under the 
two scenarios (
0,1=θ
iDBC ). The most apparent feature is that they are much closer 
to the economies' theoretical full potential for connection (100%) than DO , 
particularly when distance matters ( 1=θ ). However, the average increases have 
been more modest than in the degree of openness case, also because initial levels 
were already high. These tendencies are common under geographic neutrality and
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FIGURE 1: Degree of openness (DO), degree of balanced connection (DBC), and 
degree of integration (DI), 1967-2005 
θ = 0 θ = 1 
  
a) Degree of openness 
 
b) Degree of balanced connection 
 
c) Degree of integration 
Unweighted mean Median Weighted mean 
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TABLE 1: DGO, DGBC, DGI, distance-uncorrected and distance-corrected 
indices (%) 
Year 0=θDGO  1=θDGO   0=θDGBC  1=θDGBC   0=θDGI  1=θDGI  
1967 8.03 12.13  57.66 82.42  20.30 30.41 
1968 8.44 12.91  58.96 83.90  21.02 31.53 
1969 8.90 13.67  58.26 84.22  21.32 32.45 
1970 9.53 14.65  60.38 83.21  22.34 33.30 
1971 9.53 14.70  59.46 84.60  22.22 33.47 
1972 9.80 15.31  61.12 86.20  22.78 34.37 
1973 11.04 17.34  63.97 86.67  24.76 36.83 
1974 13.27 20.87  64.29 87.24  27.37 40.49 
1975 12.25 18.94  62.56 88.11  26.00 38.97 
1976 12.76 20.02  63.04 89.04  26.58 40.13 
1977 12.81 20.59  62.74 89.52  26.62 40.66 
1978 12.87 21.79  65.23 90.72  27.26 42.13 
1979 14.18 22.81  65.55 90.69  28.73 43.38 
1980 15.11 24.20  66.32 89.38  30.04 44.40 
1981 14.63 24.75  66.93 89.05  29.63 44.59 
1982 14.07 23.33  67.57 88.69  29.02 43.27 
1983 13.84 23.58  66.90 89.65  28.55 43.51 
1984 14.63 25.73  67.75 90.66  29.69 45.53 
1985 14.25 24.92  67.33 89.78  29.10 44.48 
1986 13.53 25.66  67.13 89.66  28.24 44.66 
1987 13.99 26.69  68.02 90.07  28.92 45.82 
1988 14.18 28.25  69.47 91.44  29.53 47.56 
1989 14.62 28.33  70.38 91.28  30.13 47.85 
1990 14.81 27.42  70.27 90.67  30.43 47.21 
1991 14.52 27.84  69.63 90.82  30.14 47.58 
1992 14.54 28.20  68.84 90.66  30.14 47.97 
1993 14.38 29.61  67.11 90.16  29.55 48.81 
1994 15.25 31.12  67.03 90.15  30.32 50.11 
1995 16.38 32.42  67.16 89.76  31.37 51.13 
1996 16.61 30.60  67.47 89.42  31.73 49.90 
1997 17.51 31.63  66.90 89.08  32.47 50.67 
1998 17.47 30.59  66.99 89.45  32.39 50.09 
1999 17.41 31.24  67.20 89.29  32.40 50.61 
2000 18.85 34.37  67.70 88.78  33.74 52.80 
2001 18.28 31.44  67.66 89.54  33.12 51.08 
2002 18.24 30.35  66.87 89.56  32.98 50.13 
2003 18.78 30.38  65.89 89.48  33.19 49.91 
2004 20.12 32.01  65.22 89.08  34.16 50.93 
2005 20.84 32.27  67.10 88.80  35.48 50.96 
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1=θ , although the increase has been even more modest in this last case. The 
values corresponding to the degree of global balanced connection DGBC  are also 
reported in Table 1. In contrast to the result obtained for the degree of openness, 
the wealthier countries (as indicated by the weighted mean) are those with the 
highest degrees of balanced connection. These values peaked before the 1990s. 
The most interesting results, however, emerge when dropping the physical 
irrelevance assumption and distance enters the analysis, since now all countries lie 
above 70%=DBC . Therefore, once the downward impact of distance on the 
volume of trade is controlled for, countries export more “proportionally” to the 
size of their trading partners. In other words, if as found and predicted by gravity 
models distance matters, and its importance does not seem to diminish strongly 
over time despite the decline in transportation costs, the current level of balanced 
connections would already be high. However, the balance would be lessened from 
the perspective of a global village, where the role of remoteness disappears. 
The degree of integration results from combining the effects of the DO  
and the DBC . The evolution of the basic summary statistics is reported in Figure 
1.c. The relevant message is not only that it indicates the level of international 
trade integration achieved by each country but, more importantly, that it indicates 
how far each country is from its theoretical full potential for integration. In 
general, countries are more integrated when controlling for distance, although 
there are some exceptions to this rule, whose degrees of integration decrease. The 
interpretation for these particular cases is straightforward: these are countries 
whose export flows suffer from a “distance bias”, the major trading partners for 
these countries are remotely located —i.e., in the case of distance being relevant, 
they should export more to their geographic neighbors. Therefore, it is obvious 
that this type of result only arises for countries sharing several characteristics, 
among which we might consider the fact of being surrounded by developing 
countries (e.g., Algeria, Gabon, Nigeria, Pakistan and, to a lesser extent, Chile) or 
being highly exporting countries whose trading partners are physically distant 
(China, Malaysia and Singapore). The specific values for the degree of global 
integration ( DGI ) are reported in Table 1. The general assessment of the level of 
world integration ( DGI ) as of 2005 is that, in the case of distance still being 
relevant, we are already halfway to the theoretical full potential for global trade 
integration. However, from the “global village” perspective in which distance 
becomes an irrelevancy, the process is still in a previous stage, since the degree of 
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global integration decreases sharply (from 50.96% to 35.48%). However, the 
variety of behaviors is wide: the standard deviation (not reported) has increased 
sharply (although the coefficient of variation has declined due to the growing 
average), and probability mass becomes increasingly spread, suggesting that some 
countries are quite close to the unity, yet many others are still far —although the 
prevailing picture is that trade integration is advancing. 
5. Analyzing the determinants of the distance trade bias  
Figure 2 provides a preliminary view on the changing role of distance over 
the 1967-2005 period. It shows the evolution of the 0=1= / θθ DGODGO , 
0=1= / θθ DGBCDGBC  and 0=1= / θθ DGIDGI  ratios, which has been rather disparate. 
Whereas all three indicators departed from similar values (ranging in the ]1.4, 1.6[ 
interval), the 0=1= / θθ DGODGO  increased until the mid nineties, and then 
decreased to virtually the initial value. The evolution of the 0=1= / θθ DGBCDGBC  
has been opposite, but much more attenuated. 0=1= / θθ DGIDGI  shows their 
combined effect. 
We consider that large discrepancies among distance-corrected and 
distance-uncorrected values of our trade integration indicators constitute an 
equivalent to the persistence of the distance coefficient in gravity equations. The 
basic version of these models considers that trade between country i  and a 
number of partner countries j , ijT , is a function of GDP of both country i  ( iY ) 
and country j  ( jY ), and geographic distance between the two countries, ijDIST . 
Therefore, the following model and the like are generally estimated,  
 ijjiijij YYDISTT εββββ ++++ )(ln)(ln)(ln=ln 3210   (6) 
where ijε  is the error term. The r.h.s. in equation (6) is usually enlarged so as to 
control for common language, land border, and colonizer, the condition of being 
landlocked, the existence of a free trade area, and sometimes a common currency. 
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FIGURE 2: The role of distance, time trend (1967-2005) 
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As we have documented, discrepancies among distance-corrected and 
uncorrected trade integration indicators vary a great deal both on average but, 
most importantly, across countries. This entails that the effect of distance is not 
homogeneous across countries and, therefore, the estimated 1β 's in equation (6) 
might be country-dependent implying that, when tackling the issue of whether 
“distance has died” or not, we should temper the statements by adding that 
distance is still significant on average. Some authors have indeed pointed out that 
nonlinearity may be the problem. For instance, Coe et al. (2007) estimate a gravity 
equation with an additive error term and find that there was some decline in the 
distance coefficient. Other authors also point out this varying effect across 
countries, by considering that geographic distance is a proxy for unfamiliarity and 
that exporters in high uncertainty-aversion countries are more sensitive to 
informational ambiguity (Huang 2007). 
We explore now some covariates which could contribute to explain the 
different role of distance for different countries. Some of them are variables 
capturing the existence of regional trade agreements. Although there is a wide 
range of different forms of integration arrangements, including free trade areas, 
customs unions, and preferential trading areas, we use RTAs as a generic 
descriptor (Greenaway and Milner 2002). Some authors consider regionalism 
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might enhance short-distance trade and therefore be the most obvious explanation 
for the non-declining role of distance (Berthelon and Freund 2008), whereas 
technological improvements might favor long-distance trade. Indeed, Hummels 
(1999) finds that containerization reduced the relative cost of distance. As 
indicated by Alesina and Spolaore (1997), trade blocs (which they label as 
political integration) harm economic integration, which is the reason why 
economic integration is usually found to be low for members of free trade 
agreements. 
Although there are currently more, we consider only the most important 
RTAs, namely, the European Union, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. These 
are major RTAs in Europe, America and Asia, although a relatively small but 
growing number apply to the trade of developing countries. Most applications of 
the gravity model have also searched for evidence of actual or potential effects by 
adding dummy variables for membership of a particular RTA. We add a related 
variable whose importance is not always considered by the literature, namely, the 
number of years each country has been member of its corresponding RTA. By 
including this dummy variable, we will be able to test whether there is an 
identifiable RTA effect, and to recognize those variables on which the RTAs' 
dummies may have stronger effects. In addition, it constitutes a good proxy for 
the depth of the commercial links between the different trading partners. 
We also include in our regressions the GDP of each country —recall that 
since we have constructed country-specific indicators we do not use bilateral 
information. Gravity equations find generally that the economic size of each 
partner is a significant explanatory variable for the trade volumes between them. 
In our specific setting, the equivalent result would be that country i 's GDP is 
significant. Not only has the general literature on gravity equations documented 
this issue but also Alesina and Spolaore (1997) among others, who argue that 
bigger domestic markets constitute important incentives for large countries to 
trade less. As also indicated by Brun et al. (2005), trade tends to constitute a 
smaller percentage of GDP for larger countries. 
We include in our regressions some of each country's specialization 
patterns. There is a vast literature on the effects of specialization on trade (see, for 
instance Redding, 2002). The changing composition of trade has been found to be 
an explanation for the stability over time of the estimated distance coefficients in 
gravity equations (Coe et al. 2002). As indicated by Berthelon and Freund (2008), 
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the increase in the importance of distance, estimated using aggregate gravity 
regressions could be due to an increase in the share of trade accounted by 
distance-sensitive products. Indeed, these authors find that distance has become 
more important for some industries. Thus, this information is crucial for 
explaining whether the effect of distance is still there or not, since there are some 
products which will be traded intensely regardless of where trading partners are 
located. In addition, in many cases the countries surrounding the main producers 
of these products have similar specializations, which makes the role of distance 
even more prominent. 
One of the most widely accepted indicators of a country's trade 
specialization is the Balassa (1965) “Revealed Comparative Advantage” (RCA) 
index [see further discussion in, for instance Leamer and Levinsohn, 1995), 
defined as:  
 
ij
ji
ij
i
ij
j
ij
ij XX
XX
RCA ∑∑∑
∑
/
/
=      (7) 
where the ratio in the numerator is the share of country j  in sector i  world 
exports, whereas the ratio in the denominator represents the same share for total 
merchandise exports. Those cases where the index takes values less than 1 
indicate these are sectors in which a country is relatively less specialized with 
respect to the world economy. Values of the index greater than 1 denote sectors in 
which a country is relatively more specialized with respect to the world economy. 
However, although this index has the advantage of being a comprehensive 
indicator of the concept of specialization, there are no clear theoretical 
foundations for this measure (Brasili et al. 2000). 
Although it was possible to consider a sectoral classification with highest 
level of detail, our data covers 10 sectors, which coincides (in terms of number of 
sectors) with previous studies such as Chen et al. (2009). We consider this is a 
reasonable balance, since reducing the number of sectors would imply 
aggregating some relevant information. These sectors include construction, basic 
metals, textiles, wood paper, metal products, chemicals, mining, energy, 
agriculture, and food products. It also includes a miscellaneous category for the 
remainder. 
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Therefore, we estimate three basic models, since we analyze the impact of 
the selected covariates in our three main indicators (openness, connection, 
integration). We also analyze some of their variants, by combining in different 
ways the set of determinants. If we refer to the ratio 0=1= / θθ DD  as the general 
expression for the three ratios 0=1= / θθ DODO , 0=1= / θθ DBCDBC  and 0=1= / θθ DIDI , 
then the model to be estimated presents the following general form:  
itititijt
j
'
itiitit RTAYRTARCAGDPDD εββγβαθθ +++++ ∑ 5410=1= =/  (8) 
where itGDP  is the logarithm of country i  GDP in year t , ijtRCA  is the Balassa 
Revealed Comparative Advantage index for country i , sector j  and year t , 
itYRTA  are the numbers of years country i  is member of its corresponding RTA 
(if this applies) in year t , and itRTA  is a dummy variable which takes the value of 
1 for countries members of the RTA considered. We include the t  subscript so as 
to account for the time dimension of the role of distance. As indicated by Brun et 
al. (2005), if using cross-section to estimate equation (8) and the like, there are 
potential problems. Some of them are related to the heterogeneity not captured by 
dummy variables, which could cause biased estimates. Others are related to the 
omitted-variables bias to which typical ordinary least squares estimates may be 
prone to. Therefore, we estimate equation (8) using cross-section fixed effects, 
which are included in the iα  parameter, so that the unobservable heterogeneity is 
partly addressed. 
However, the impact of the different RTAs on distance might be involved, 
since RTAs differ in many respects. For instance, in Europe integration goes 
beyond merely establishing a free trade area, since both capital and labor can 
move freely and there is an even more ambitious initiative for political integration 
with the European Constitution. This is a big contrast with the features of 
NAFTA, where free flow of labor across member estates is not possible. 
Therefore, we consider relevant to analyze separately each particular RTA might 
affect distance by considering four simpler versions of equation (8) in which the 
RTA variable is substituted by EU , NAFTA , ASEAN  and MERCOSUR  
variables. 
Table 2 shows estimation results for equation (8) in which the dependent 
variable is 0=1= / θθ DODO , whereas Table 3 and Table 4 show the same 
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TABLE 2: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of openness, 1967-2005 
 
Dependent variable: 
0=1= / θθ DODO   Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (Intercept)  -1.466*** -1.460*** -1.454*** -1.449*** -1.476*** 
 (0.243) (0.244) (0.244) (0.244) (0.243) 
GDP 0.237*** 0.238*** 0.236*** 0.236*** 0.239*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
CONSTRUCTION -0.039* -0.049** -0.049** -0.050** -0.040* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
BASIC_METALS -0.034** -0.035** -0.035** -0.034** -0.032** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
TEXTILES -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.040*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
WOOD_PAPER -0.099*** -0.085*** -0.083*** -0.085*** -0.095*** 
 (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) 
METAL_PRODUCTS 0.011 0.010 0.017 0.011 0.013 
 (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
CHEMICALS -0.141*** -0.142*** -0.144*** -0.142*** -0.142*** 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
MINING -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
ENERGY -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
AGRICULTURE 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
FOOD_PRODUCTS 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
MISC 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
YRTA -0.003** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EU -0.133***     
 (0.031)     
NAFTA  -0.064    
  (0.049)    
ASEAN   -0.149*   
   (0.062)   
MERCOSUR    -0.001  
    (0.058)  
RTA     -0.101*** 
     (0.024) 
 R2 0.195 0.188 0.190 0.188 0.194 
σ   0.239 0.240 0.239 0.240 0.239 
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TABLE 2: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of openness, 1967-2005 
 
Dependent variable: 
0=1= / θθ DODO   Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
F 190.438 188.736 189.134 188.565 190.345 
P 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Log-likelihood  69.344 60.463 62.548 59.568 68.860 
Deviance  126.843 127.826 127.594 127.925 126.896 
AIC 9.311 27.074 22.904 28.863 10.281 
BIC 434.153 451.916 447.745 453.704 435.122 
N 2301 2301 2301 2301 2301 
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively. 
 
information for 0=1= / θθ DBCDBC  and 0=1= / θθ DIDI , respectively. Table 2 indicates 
that the effect of GDP  on distance —as measured by larger discrepancies among 
1=θDO  and 0=θDO — is positive. This implies that for big economies openness is 
strongly affected by distance, as heavily documented in the literature (home 
market effect hypothesis). This coefficient is positive and significant at the 1% 
significant level throughout. 
In contrast, the share of total energy in each country's exports ( ENERGY ) 
affects negatively and significantly throughout the discrepancies between 1=θDO  
and 0=θDO . This result is reasonable, implying that high energy-exporting 
countries are those whose openness is less affected by distance (their volume of 
exports is not determined by the location of their trading partners), whereas the 
opposite pattern holds for low energy-exporting countries. This effect does not 
hold for other specializations such as EAGRICULTUR  and 
PRODUCTSFOOD_ , whose sign is positive throughout —albeit not significant. 
The variables related to free trade areas must be commented on jointly, 
given there are non-negligible interactions among them. Countries with the 
highest 0=1= / θθ DODO  ratios are those more affected by distance when evaluating 
their openness. However, as indicated by the last column in Table 2 
(corresponding to Model 5), being member of a regional trade agreement ( RTA  
variable) affects negatively 0=1= / θθ DODO  or, equivalently, countries adhered to 
RTAs are less affected by distance in their degrees of openness. This sign is 
dominated by the negative and significant coefficient (at the 1% level) found for 
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EU  (Model 1), and constitutes a reasonable result, given that many EU countries 
are quite open —especially to their RTA partners. Yet not all RTAs contribute in 
the same amount, since only EU  and ASEAN  show significant relationships (in 
the case of ASEAN , at the 10% significance level only), whereas both NAFTA  
and MERCOSUR  are negative albeit non-significant. Therefore, one may easily 
infer it is relevant to consider the different trade agreements separately due to their 
varying effects on the dependent variable. Finally, we also analyze the “depth” of 
the free trade agreements, as measured by YRTA , whose sign is negative and 
significant (1%) throughout, i.e., the longer the durability of the RTA , the less 
relevant the effect of distance —as revealed by lower discrepancies between 
1=θDO  and 0=θDO . Therefore, it seems that once a particular country becomes 
member of a RTA, the effect of distance shortly turns as relevant as for older 
members. 
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of each covariate on 
0=1= / θθ DBCDBC . In general, as revealed by Table 3, results vary remarkably with 
respect to those in Table 2, constituting further evidence on how different the 
economic meanings of the degree of openness and the degree of balanced 
connection are. Indeed, in many instances the sign of the relationships is reversed, 
corroborating that DO  and DBC  are but different ways through which 
economies become more trade integrated. 
The impact of GDP  on 0=1= / θθ DBCDBC  is negative and significant 
throughout. Countries for which this discrepancy is high are those whose trading 
partners (both in terms of number and proportionality) are close —i.e., once we 
control for distance, the DBC  increases sharply. This means that large countries, 
in terms of GDP, export more proportionally, both in terms of distance and size of 
their trading partners. This finding might constitute a certain surprise for some 
large countries like the US, whose exports to Canada are higher than those to 
distant and large countries such as Germany. However, for some other big 
economies, not only Germany itself but also Japan, China or India, exports are 
more geographically neutral —these countries export regardless of the location of 
the importing countries, and in proportion to their relative sizes. 
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TABLE 3: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of balanced connection, 1967-2005 
 
Dependent variable: 
0=1= / θθ DBCDBC  Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (Intercept)  4.370*** 4.364*** 4.290*** 4.349*** 4.330*** 
 (0.398) (0.400) (0.380) (0.400) (0.400) 
GDP -0.204*** -0.206*** -0.205*** -0.202*** -0.201*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.026) 
CONSTRUCTION 0.088*** 0.105*** 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.111*** 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) 
BASIC_METALS 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.122*** 0.123*** 0.127*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) 
TEXTILES 0.074*** 0.073*** 0.068*** 0.074*** 0.073*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
WOOD_PAPER 0.035 0.014 0.032 0.012 0.009 
 (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024) 
METAL_PRODUCTS 0.188*** 0.189*** 0.250*** 0.184*** 0.189*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.052) (0.052) 
CHEMICALS -0.128** -0.127** -0.149*** -0.128** -0.128** 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.044) (0.044) 
MINING -0.026*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.025*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
ENERGY 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.073*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
AGRICULTURE 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.063*** 0.057*** 0.059*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
FOOD_PRODUCTS 0.012 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
MISC -0.045*** -0.043*** -0.036*** -0.044*** -0.043*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
YRTA -0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
EU 0.218***     
 (0.050)     
NAFTA  0.125    
  (0.080)    
ASEAN   -1.502***   
   (0.097)   
MERCOSUR    0.112  
    (0.094)  
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TABLE 3: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of balanced connection, 1967-2005 
 
Dependent variable: 
0=1= / θθ DBCDBC  Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
RTA     -0.045 
     (0.039) 
 R2  0.177   0.171   0.251   0.171   0.171  
σ    0.391   0.392   0.373   0.392   0.392  
F  76.931   76.142   87.621   76.091   76.089  
p  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Log-likelihood   -1064.744   -1073.184   -956.036   -1073.735   -1073.760  
Deviance   339.911   342.414   309.264   342.578   342.585  
AIC  2277.489   2294.367   2060.071   2295.470   2295.519  
BIC  2702.330   2719.209   2484.912   2720.312   2720.360  
N  2301   2301   2301   2301   2301  
*, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
The specialization variables are not entirely coincidental either when 
comparing Table 2 and Table 3, and some results are intricate. However, in some 
cases the sign of the coefficient is what one may a priori expect. For instance, 
although the coefficient of EAGRICULTUR  is not significant in Table 2, in Table 
3 it is positive and significant at the 1% level, implying that for those countries 
more specialized in agriculture (according to the RCA  index of specialization) 
distance is quite relevant —the DBC  index rises sharply when comparing 
0=θDBC  and 1=θDBC . Therefore, these countries, given their specialization in 
agricultural products (generally perishable, and object of preferential trade 
agreements), use to export to their neighbors, and consequently are not affected by 
geographically-neutral trade. 
The variables related to free trade area membership do also show 
dissimilar patterns when comparing results in Table 2 and Table 3. The general 
effect ( RTA ) is not reversed, but it loses significance entirely. However, this 
outcome is the combination of opposed effects. On the one hand, analogously to 
what was found for DO  (Table 2), the effect of ASEAN  is negative and 
significant —but now the significance is much higher (1%). In contrast, all EU , 
MERCOSUR  and NAFTA  not only are significant but, most importantly, the sign 
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of the coefficient is positive. Again, the effect of free trade area membership 
varies across the different trade agreements. In the particular case of EU , 
MERCOSUR  and NAFTA  the positive effect indicates that the architecture of 
trade relations of their members is positively biased towards other members of the 
agreement. In the case of ASEAN , however, the effect is the opposite, and the 
bias exists towards non-members of the free trade agreement. 
Table 4 shows the effect on 0=1= / θθ DIDI  of the different explanatory 
variables. Since DI  is constructed as a square root of the product of DO  and 
DBC , the results in Table 4 are those one might expect by combining results in 
Table 2 and Table 3. However, since the degree of openness and the degree of 
connection convey different economic meanings, results in Table 4 are involved, 
consisting basically of a dominance effect —i.e., the sign of each coefficient is 
derived from the effect that actually dominates the relationship. 
In those cases in which the effects are opposite, significance is generally 
lost. That is the case of GDP , whose impact on 0=1= / θθ DIDI  is negative, albeit 
non-significant —as a result of a positive and significant effect on 0=1= / θθ DODO  
and a negative and significant effect on 0=1= / θθ DBCDBC . In the case of some 
particular specializations such as ENERGY , its negative and strongly significant 
effect on the degree of balance connection dominates, resulting into a positive and 
significant effect on the degree of integration in all models. However, there were 
other cases such as CHEMICALS  and, to a lesser extent, MINING  in which both 
the sign of the relationship and the significance coincided and, therefore, the 
impact on the degree of integration is maintained. 
The impact of the free trade area variables is more involved. In general, 
the sign of the relationship coincides with the sign and significance found for the 
degree of connection (Table 3), with the exception of RTA  for which significance 
is lost. Therefore, it seems for these variables ( EU , NAFTA , ASEAN , 
MERCOSUR  and the summary variable, RTA ), the importance of the degree of 
openness is dimmed with respect to the degree of connection. 
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TABLE 4: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of integration, 1967-2005 
 
Dependent variable: 
0=1= / θθ DIDI  Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 (Intercept)  1.862*** 1.864*** 1.839*** 1.858*** 1.858*** 
 (0.134) (0.135) (0.131) (0.135) (0.135) 
GDP -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
CONSTRUCTION 0.033*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.037*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
BASIC_METALS 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 0.022*** 0.023*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TEXTILES 0.013*** 0.013** 0.011** 0.013*** 0.013** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
WOOD_PAPER -0.021** -0.028*** -0.024** -0.030*** -0.027*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
METAL_PRODUCTS -0.007 -0.006 0.009 -0.010 -0.007 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
CHEMICALS -0.079*** -0.078*** -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.079*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
MINING -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ENERGY 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
AGRICULTURE 0.016*** 0.017*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
FOOD_PRODUCTS 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
MISC -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
YRTA -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
EU 0.074***     
 (0.017)     
NAFTA  0.064*    
  (0.027)    
ASEAN   -0.389***   
   (0.033)   
MERCOSUR    0.089**  
    (0.032)  
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TABLE 4: Determinants of the distance effect, degree of integration, 1967-2005 
 
Dependent variable: 
0=1= / θθ DIDI  Coefficients 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
RTA     0.020 
     (0.013) 
R2 0.139 0.133 0.181 0.134 0.132 
σ    0.132   0.132   0.128   0.132   0.132  
F  127.866   126.922   136.167   127.077   126.681  
p  0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000   0.000  
Log-likelihood   1436.559   1429.703   1495.177   1430.834   1427.943  
Deviance   38.651   38.882   36.731   38.844   38.942  
AIC  -2725.118   -2711.406   -2842.355   -2713.667   -2707.886  
BIC  -2300.277   -2286.564   -2417.514   -2288.826   -2283.044  
N  2301   2301   2301   2301   2301  
* , ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels, respectively.   
 
6. Conclusions  
Since the emergence of the study by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), many 
research initiatives have debated about the apparent inconsistency of declining 
trade-related costs (at least for some products) and a highly negative and 
significant coefficient of distance in gravity equations, which does not diminish 
over time. Some authors (Anderson and Van Wincoop 2004) claim such 
inconsistency might not be real when realizing that technology growth in shipping 
advanced more slowly than the rest of the economy during the XX century and, 
consequently, transport costs might have increased as a fraction of average 
marginal production costs. However, this interpretation has not been widely 
accepted, and there is a non-negligible body of the literature that has explored 
different explanations for this inconsistency (since with globalization one would 
expect the distance coefficient to decline over time). 
We provide yet another explanation for this “missing globalization 
puzzle”, as coined by Coe et al (2002), also labeled as “the conservation of 
distance in international trade” (Berthelon and Freund 2008). Much of this 
 28
evidence is framed within the context of gravity equations, as indicated by the 
meta-analysis by Disdier and Head (2008). Alternatively, we adopt a different 
stance, basing our explanation on the construction of two sets of indicators on 
economic integration, one of them controlling for distance, the other distance-
uncorrected. These indicators are based on the geographical neutrality concept by 
Krugman (1996) and the Standard of Perfect International Integration by Frankel 
(2000). 
Results indicate that the discrepancies found among both sets of indicators 
(distance-corrected and distance-uncorrected) have a non-negligible dynamic 
component, since the importance of distance increased until the mid-nineties, but 
has returned to 30 years ago levels. This implies that, according to our indicators, 
the role of distance, on average, is still there. 
However, it is a more interesting result that discrepancies among distance-
corrected and distance-uncorrected indicators differ a great deal across countries, 
i.e., the effect of distance is there, but the impact on each country's level of 
integration is varying. A mere cursory look to the different levels on integration 
for the different countries in our sample will promptly suggest that the pattern 
might not be entirely random. Accordingly, we explore some factors (without 
establishing a proper theory) that might explain these discrepancies, finding that 
GDP, specialization and regional trade agreements contribute to explain the 
heterogeneity. Yet for some of the explanatory variables the relationship is rather 
involved, since RTA membership affects distance depending on each particular 
RTA. 
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